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The literature reviewed suggests thatNetwork Intrusion Systems (NIDS) are valuable tools for the
detectionofmalicious behaviour in network environments.NIDSprovidealerts and the trigger for
rapid responses to attacks. Our previous research had shown that NIDS performance in wireless
networkshadawidevariationunderdifferentworkloads.Inthisresearchwechosewirednetworks
andaskedthequestion:WhatistheevidentialvalueofNIDS?ThreedifferentNIDSweretestedunder









IntrusionDetection systems are the tools that process, identify and respond tomalicious activity
targeted at information and networking resources (Lokhande, Bhaskarwar, Bhaskarwar, &
Chidrawar,2012). Ingeneral IDSsare categorized into the two types;network intrusiondetection
systems (NIDS) and hostbased IDS. A NIDS monitors packets on the network and attempts to
discover ifahacker istryingtobreakintoasystem(Maier,Sommer,Dreger,Feldmann,Paxson,&
Schneider, 2008). A typical example is a system that watches a large number of TCP connection
requests (SYN) for many different ports on a target machine, thus discovering if someone is
attemptingaTCPportscan.Thistechnologyhasbeenmadetocompareusers’actionagainstknown
attack scenariosandbeable topredictand indicate suspiciousbehaviour.Thereare two typesof









malicious actions, it is impossible to put all these activities on a list and keep it manageable.
Therefore,thereareonlyalimitednumberofactionsignaturesaddedtothelistandthelimitation





(Sommer, 1999; Nikkel, 2005). These systems and/or products are available in two types; either
opensourcesoftwareorcommercialonesandallofthemareaddressingarangeoforganizational
security goals and considerations. Snort is one of the most popular deployed systems in most
network security environments and it is considered to have a huge dataset of signatures for
malicious activities. It searches for very specific content in the network stream and reports each
instanceofaparticularsignature.Snort’smodulardesignallowsdeveloperstocreateandaddextra
features into the core detection engine.  However, snort may have some disadvantages such as
37 
 
dropping packets when the process network rate is at 100200 megabytes per second before
reaching the processing limit of a single CPU because the Snort engine is designed toworkwith
singlethreadedmultistage units. Research reports have compared Snort with other IDS such as
Suricata and BroIDS that offer different features and capabilities. They concluded that Suricata’s
multithreaded architecture requires more memory and CPU resources than Snort but it can
accommodatemanynetworkinstanceswithnoneedtousemultipleinstances.Ontheotherhand,
snort isefficientbutwith limitedability tomeasuremorethan200300Mbpsnetworkbandwidth
perinstance(Saari&Jantan,2011).Bothsystemswereobservedtomissseveralcommonmalicious
packets. BroIDS is slightly different in that it usesmore sophisticated signatures bymeans of its
policy language. It can analyse network traffic at a much higherlevel of abstraction, and has
powerful facilities for storing information about past activity and incorporating it into analysis of
newactivitywhichmeans it isbetter for forensics. IDScanbeselected forcontext,used together
andoptimisedforpurpose.

Numerouspapers havebeenpublished suggesting thatNIDS canbeused as sources of evidence;
however,eachreferenceacknowledgesthatthereisagapbetweenthepurposesofNIDSsandthe
needsofthelegalsystem(Casey,2004).Thisgapdoesn’tonlylackatafunctionalandapurposive
level, but also the preservation and completeness of evidencemay be insufficient or incomplete.
Hence consideration of embedding NIDS in support systems and improving NIDS capability are
potential solutions. Some recent intrusion detection systems are capable of recording malicious
commands including source and distinct network addresses, protocol used, event characteristics
suchastimeanddateandfurtherrelatedinformationsuchasusernameandfilenameappliedwithin




outline the analytic potential for attacks, duration accounting of the exploit and recording the
methods applied during the attack (Saari& Jantan, 2011; Kaur& Kaur, 2012). These descriptions
includelogsysteminformationgathering,adaptivecaptureofnetworktraffic,storingthehistorical
network misuse patterns and active or automated responses for investigational forensics. A
suggested investigatory system contains four elements which are a forensics server, network
forensicsagents,networkmonitors,andnetworkinvestigatorsoftware(Reith,Carr&Gunsch,2002).
Another simple framework for distributed forensics has an integrated platform for automatic
evidence collection and efficient data storage, and matching known attribution methods against
attacks. Thismodelhasproxyandagentarchitectures that collect, stores,processesandanalyses
forensic information. One advantage is automatic evidence collection and quick responses to
networkattacks.Othersystemsprovideacombinationofagenttheoriesandartificialintelligenceto
dynamically assure evidence retention and extraction capabilities. The systems have different
elements tostoredata intheforensicsserverandcollect thedata fromforensicagents,detector
agents and responseagents. The detectoragent, forensicsagent and responseagentsmanage to








that generally inadequate evidence was stored for forensic purposes (Laurenson, 2010). These






Laurenson’s (2010) researchwasconducted inawirelessnetwork sowe resolved thevariationof
testinghisfindingsinawirednetwork.AlsohechosetotestNIDSunderincreasingworkloads.We
resolvedtodothesamebutinadditiontoconsiderthecomplexityvariableasapotentialinfluence












Daubert criteria (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daubert_standard) to be a fair representation and
generalisationofthegroundsonwhichacourtmayacceptevidence.Thecriteriaare:
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NIDS are principally software assets thatmanage adverse events andmaintain the system status
quo. Inouranalysisof literaturenoneaddressedtheevidential issueofprosecutingoffendersand
henceliftingthesystemdefencetoalevelofhumanaccountability.Thiswouldnotbethecaseifa
retailshopwasbrokenintoanddamagesdone.Thepolicewouldbecalledandevidencecollectedto






























forensic server retained all evidence generated by the configured NIDS plus all traffic passing
through thenetwork.BroIDSandSuricatadeliveredmoreevidence thanSnortasbothhadmore






all fell to zeroby 100Mbs. The system costs (4) in termsof CPUusage andmemory requirement
wereasexpected(seefigure4).AsapercentageofCPUusageBroIDSandSuricatawerebothmore
costly. These costs were expected because the NIDS with higher level abstractions also require
greater computational power and storage services. Snort is a long established product that was
designedforminimalrequirementsandasaconsequenceis ineffectiveundercomplexattacksand
heavyworkloads.However it is economical in termsof its cost to the systemandpresents a low
overhead. Subquestion (5) required higher level analysis to resolve the relationship between the
dataandtheDaubertcriteria.

The scenario is that a NIDS is being used to collect evidence of a system attack. Under the first
Daubertcriteriatheevidenceisnotrepeatablebecausethedatasetsareincompleteandeachtrial
forempiricaltestingisauniqueevent.Undercriteria2.,theuseofNIDSforcollectingevidencehave


















































0.4 10 30 60 80 100
Broids 4 4 4 2 1 0
Snort 4 3 1 1 0 0





































The results of this research are disturbing. The literature reviewed suggested that NIDS were
valuable assets for network security and forensic investigation. The literature also indicated
weaknessesinNIDSthatcanaffecteffectivenessandourresultsconfirmLaurenson’s(2010)general
performance concerns found in wireless networks. NIDS act as detection systems and trigger
responsesystemstoprotectassets.Inadditionlogfilesarekept(whenconfigured)sothatrecords







evidence of an attack that can be made available from the system log files. The evidence is
consequently used in a forensic post event fashion to better prepare and to prevent a similar
occurrence.However,contrarytothestrongassertionsmadeintheliteraturethepopularNIDSwe
testedandundertheconditionsfailedtoperformasrequired.Theimplicationsofourfindingsare
both for alerts and responses and for post mortem actions. The data showed that under some




incorrect transaction points; effectively taking $1000s from stores. Similarly Cross Site scripting
attackshavebeenusedagainstbankstofuzzonlinebankingformsandtosteal$1000s.Thecostto
businessesofmissingoneoftheseattacksishigh;andyetourstudyshowsthat100%oftheattacks





















The second part of the question concerned the availability and the quality of evidence for
prosecutingoffenders.Asmentionedabovethisistheusualexpectationwheredamagesorthefthas
occurred to a business or the systems. We used the Daubert criteria to assess the potential
admissibilityoftheevidencetocourt. Assessmentofthefirstcriteriasuggestedthatrepeatability
andthe incompletedatasetsareaproblem.Criteria2hasbeensatisfiedbut thetestreportscite




such findings in the reportbasedon thestrengthof the investigationmethodology.However, the
gapsandexceptionsexistentintheprimaryevidencecollectionwillrequirecollaborativeevidences
fromother sources to explain theNIDS contribution. A further andmore challenging question is:
Whyiscriteria5satisfiedintheITsecuritycommunity?Fromtheliteraturerevieweditiseasytosee
that the strong case is thatNIDSare effective andefficient fordetectionand relianton for rapid
response defence. The weaker case made in the literature is for conditions on performance. To
simply explain the discrepancies as a cost benefit tradeoff overlooks the weighted problem of
reputationand credibility.Abrandmay financially accommodatemany successfulattacks through
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